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INTRODUCTION
Lynx and Lamb Gaede are fourteen-year-old identical twins from
Bakersfield, California,' folk singers with a strong fan base, who have
already produced an album. 2  They are also neo-Nazi white
supremacists. 3 Their music is an expression of their white supremacist
ideology, which their mother, April Gaede, taught them.4 Mrs. Gaede
t B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 2004; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2007; Note
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 92. The author would like to thank Adam Gasthalter,
Kyle Taylor, and Ben Carlisle for the countless hours they have contributed to editing this
piece. She would also like to express her deepest gratitude to her family and friends,
particularly Keisha, Kaleen, and Sekai, for their unending support, encouragement, and
guidance.
I See ABC News, Youth Singers Spread Racist Hate (Oct. 20, 2005), http://
abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=123168 4 &page=l.
2 See id. Lynx and Lamb perform under the moniker "Prussian Blue," named for
"their German heritage and bright blue eyes." Id. Prussian blue is also the color of Zyklon
B pesticide residue, which Lynx and Lamb allege was absent in the "so-called gas chambers
in the concentration camps." SeeJesse Pearson, Hello, White People!: Prusian Blue Look to the
Future, VIcE MAGAZINE, Jan 7, 2007, http://www.viceland.com/issues/vllnIO/htdocs/
hello.php.
3 ABC News, supra note 1.
4 See id.
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home schools the two girls and infuses these ideas into the curricula 5
because she believes that her children "need to have the background
to understand why certain things are happening."6 For example,
among the lessons that Mrs. Gaede teaches is that the Roman Empire
fell due to the overmixing of races7 and that Lynx and Lamb should
be skeptical about the Holocaust and that they should doubt that six
million Jews even existed at that time. 8 Mrs. Gaede, in professing
these beliefs, recognizes that "all children pretty much espouse their
parents' attitudes" and swears that she will continue to share "that part
of [her] life with [her] children."9 Lynx summarizes her views:
"We're proud of being white, we want to keep being white .... We
want our people to stay white[,] we don't want to just be . ..a big
muddle."'10 She concludes, "We just want to preserve our race."'"I
The Supreme Court has observed that "[t]here is no doubt as to
the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and dura-
tion of basic education."' 2 However, the Court has also recognized
the parental right to "direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren."'13 Home schooling, therefore, places the state's interest in edu-
cation at odds with the parents' interest in the upbringing of their
child. 14
Although every state provides for home schooling,15 tension gen-
erally arises when the state seeks to regulate aspects of home school-
5 See id.
6 Id.
7 See Aaron Cell, Minor Threat, GQ, men.style.com/gq/features/land-
ing?id=content_4207 (last visited Apr.1, 2007).
8 See Tracy Connor, Pop Twerps from Heil Can't Carry Tune, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30,
2005, available at WL at 2005 WLNR 25300869.
9 ABC News, supra note 1.
10 Id.
II Id.
12 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
13 Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (holding that the right of Amish parents to refuse to send their children to
public schools after the eighth grade outweighed the considerations behind Oregon's
compulsory attendance statute).
14 See CHRISTOPHERJ. KLIcKA, THE RIGHT TO HOME SCHOOL: A GUIDE TO THE LAW ON
PARENTS' RIGHTS IN EDUCATION 1-27 (3d ed. 2002). Klicka explains,
Home schooling is exactly what the name implies: a school in the home.
The Illinois Supreme Court defined a school as "a place where instruction
is imparted to the young." The teachers in a home school are usually the
parents, and it is estimated that at least 50% of the parents have only a high
school diploma.
Id. at I (citations omitted).
15 See Bruce D. Page, Changing Our Perspective: How Presumptive Invalidity of Home School
Regulations Will Further the State's Interest in an Educated Citizenry, 14 REGENT U. L. REv. 181,
189 (2002).
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ing that the parents believe are within their own province.' 6 This is
particularly so if the parent chooses to home school specifically to
avoid state interference. Regulations may require that the home-
schooling parent have achieved a certain level of education,' 7 that the
child learns particular subjects, or that the students participate in stan-
dardized testing.' 8 The state often justifies such regulations as neces-
sary to further its interest in universal education.' 9
Nonetheless, the state cannot create "regulations so severe as to
eradicate the distinction between home and public education [so as
to] destroy the alternative of private education guaranteed by Pierce."2°
Such regulations would infringe on "the historical and fundamental
right of parents to have their children free from standardization of
their education. '21 Nevertheless, the state possesses an interest in reg-
ulating home-schooling curricula for the same reasons it possesses an
interest in regulating the curricula of public schools.2 2 Neither public
nor private schools would satisfy state education requirements if they
taught neo-Nazi revisionist history to Lynx and Lamb, and therefore
the state should have the authority to reject such teachings regardless
of the forum in which the child learns them. 23
This Note queries whether the state's interest in the content of
home-schooling curricula can justify universal standardized testing of
all subjects. Part I provides background pertaining to home school-
ing's history, benefits, and concerns. It explores the state's interest in
this area, the degree to which competing parental interests have
clashed with those of the state, and the related legislative trends. Part
II of this Note examines whether parents have a fundamental right to
direct the education of their children and, if so, what compelling state
interest may justify home-schooling regulation. The Note concludes
that universal standardized testing will resolve the negative conse-
quences of implicit state approval of home-schooling curricula with-
out unnecessarily infringing on the parental right to direct the
upbringing of one's child.
16 See id.
17 See KLicKcA, supra note 14, at 141 (discussing the various teaching qualification stat-
utes from the nine states that had such statutes as of May 1997).
t8 See id. at 161, 163.
19 Id. at 22-27.
20 Id. at 46.
21 Id.
22 See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534 (1925).
23 This Note does not argue that states should deny parents the right to teach their
children such beliefs but contends that the teaching of such beliefs should not satisfy state
education requirements. For example, Mrs. Gaede may teach her children white suprema-
cist beliefs but not with the implicit approval of the state of California.
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I
BACKGROUND
A. Case History
Our national educational traditions originated in home school-
ing.24 The idea that parents are responsible for educating their chil-
dren is "rooted in Anglo-American common law." 2 5 In the fledgling
days of the colonies, parents retained control over whether their chil-
dren would attend the schools that the state provided. 26 In 1642, Mas-
sachusetts Bay Colony passed the first compulsory education law.27
However, it was not until Massachusetts passed a compulsory attend-
ance statute in 1852 that the state established its compelling interest
in education. 28 This shift to compulsory attendance laws occurred for
at least two reasons. First, as the nation became more industrialized,
the geographic concentration of people made mass education more
economical. 29 Second, as immigration increased, the state came to
view education as a viable means of assimilating new Americans into
society."
The new compulsory attendance laws created tension between pa-
rental rights and state interest. Prior to the introduction of such laws,
public schools were merely an option that a parent could choose to
utilize.31 Indeed, "state involvement with education during this pe-
riod was based on a concern over easing parental duties rather than
an interest in an educated society." 32 After states passed and courts
upheld compulsory attendance laws, parents had fewer options, and
the state interest in education strengthened. 33 To this day, it remains
an open question whether the state's power to educate children is
grounded in a delegation from the parents or whether it is indepen-
dent of any other interest 34: "[T] he inception of public education as
a tool for easing the burden of parents' historically recognized obliga-
tion to educate their children[ ] evolved [into] legislative and judicial
theories that '[t] he state has the right to educate its youth in order to
24 See Kara T. Burgess, Comment, The Constitutionality of Home Education Statutes, 55
UMKC L. REv. 69, 69-70 (1986).
25 Id. at 69.
26 Id. at 69-70.
27 Id. at 70.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See KlicKA, supra note 14, at 32.
34 See Burgess, supra note 24, at 72-75 (discussing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
recognizing both the parental right to educate their children and the governmental inter-
est in controlling education).
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insure its survival.'" 3 5 Nevertheless, "[e]ach of these two contenders
for power-the public state and the private family-claims a stake in
regulating and shaping children's development."36
Regardless of the tensions between parental rights and the state's
interest, the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution protect home schooling, and it is both legal and prac-
ticed in every state. 37 Meyer v. Nebraska38 was the first case to explicitly
recognize the parental interest in a child's education as deriving from
the Fourteenth Amendment.39 In Meyer, a Nebraska statute forbade
the teaching of any foreign language, except for ancient and dead
languages, to children who had not yet passed the eighth grade. 40
The State claimed an interest in promoting civic development by en-
suring that all children born and reared in the United States spoke
English proficiently.41 The Court held that the statute violated the
due process rights of the parents, 42 noting that state action that is ei-
ther arbitrary or lacks reasonable relation to some state interest in-
fringes on the Fourteenth Amendment.43 Because "the Legislature
ha[d] attempted materially to interfere with the ... power of parents
to control the education of their own,' 4 4 the Court held the statute to
be arbitrary and without reasonable constraint.4 5
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names ofJesus & May46 relied
on the Meyer rationale to strike down an Oregon statute4 7 that re-
quired all parents or guardians of children between the ages of eight
and sixteen to send their children to public school in the district
where the child resided. 48 The respondents were the Society of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, a corporation "with the
power to care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, [and] es-
tablish and maintain schools,' 49 as well as Hill Military Academy, a
35 Id. at 70-71 (quoting Herbert W. Titus, Education, Caesar's or God's: A Constitutional
Question of Jurisdiction, 3J. CHRISTIAN JURIS. 101, 114 (1982)).
36 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the Debate About the Socialization of Children:
An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 86 (2004).
37 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 27, 159.
38 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39 As the Court stated in Meyer, "[t]he problem for our determination is whether the
statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the
plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 399.
40 Id. at 397.
41 See id. at 397-98.
42 See id. at 402-03.
43 See id. at 400.
44 Id. at 401.
45 See id. at 403.
46 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
47 See id. 534-35.
48 See id. at 530-31 (explaining that failure to comply with the statute was punishable
by misdemeanor).
49 Id. at 531.
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private corporation that runs "for profit an elementary, college pre-
paratory, and military training school for boys." 50 The respondents
alleged that the statute violated their Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 51 The Court did not agree with the respondents' assertion that
their own Fourteenth Amendment rights were being infringed upon
but held instead that the statute "unreasonably interfere[d] with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control. '52 The Court acknowledged also
that a "child is not the mere creature of the state [and that] those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 53
Wisconsin v. Yoder54 analyzed the parental rights issue via the First
Amendment.55 In Yoder, the respondents challenged the validity of a
Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance law under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. 56 The respondents belonged to the
Old Order Amish religion and objected to the compulsory attendance
laws as detrimental to their religion and way of life. 57 They believed
that "by sending their children to high school, they would not only
expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church commu-
nity, but... also endanger their own salvation and that of their chil-
dren. '58 The respondents objected to sending their children to
public school after the eighth grade, but the state law required attend-
ance until the child reached sixteen years of age. 59 Amish beliefs em-
phasize farm work or a similar profession, learning by doing, and
wisdom as opposed to intellect and technical knowledge. 60 The
Amish believe that the values taught in high school and higher educa-
tion are generally contrary to the Amish way of life.61 Amish parents
objected to the worldly influences present in high school and other
higher education institutions that foster competition and were con-
cerned that if their children could not grow up among the Amish,
they would be ill-equipped to handle the religious obligations accom-
50 Id. at 533.
51 See id. at 532-33. Specifically, the respondents argued that the statute violated their
rights as corporations not to be deprived of their property without due process of law
because it would effectively prevent their schools from having any students. See id.
52 Id. at 534-35.
53 Id. at 535.
54 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
55 See id.
56 Id. at 209.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 207.
60 See id. at 211-12.
61 See id. at 211.
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panying baptism.62 Because public education is inimical to the Amish
religion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
holding that the statute violated the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment.63
The Yoder Court premised its holdings on several considerations.
First, the Court determined that "[t] here is no doubt as to the power
of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to
impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education."64 The Court conceded that this power is by no means
absolute, but rather "yield[s] to the right of parents to provide an
equivalent education in a privately operated system." 65 More specifi-
cally, the power yields to the Free Exercise Clause and parents' inter-
est in controlling the religious upbringing of their children. 66 The
Court's rationale stressed that the compulsory attendance statute af-
fected the respondents' religion as opposed to their way of life. 67 Con-
versely, state regulation that infringes on parents' right to direct their
children's secular upbringing does not rise to the level of requiring
strict scrutiny.68 As the Court observed, "[a] way of life, however virtu-
ous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable
state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular
considerations. 69
B. Justifications for Home Schooling
There are various reasons why a parent might opt for home
schooling, of which religion is particularly notable. 70 Still, religion is
not the only reason to home school as "both religious and non-relig-
ious parents express pedagogical concerns, having concluded that
home schooling will better serve their children's academic or social
needs."' 7' Some parents may believe that the social experience that
public schools offer today is "inappropriate and detrimental to the
learning process." 72 Other parents may remove their children from
public schools and begin home schooling because they disapprove of
62 Id. at 211-12. The Amish conduct adult baptisms to symbolize a young adult's
acceptance of the Amish way of life. See id. at 211.
63 See id. at 207, 216.
64 Id. at 213 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)).
65 Id.
66 See id. at 214.
67 See id. at 215-16.
68 See People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 111-12 (Mich. 1993).
69 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
70 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 49.
71 Page, supra note 15, at 186.
72 Id. at 197.
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sex and drug education or believe that teachers are no longer
effective.7 3
The benefits of home schooling are manifold.7 4 Standardized
tests are generally administered to home-school students as well as
public school students.75 A 1994 study found that almost 55% of
home-schooled students scored in the top quarter of all students tak-
ing standardized tests.76 Home schoolers also frequently surpass their
publicly educated counterparts in college. 77 Furthermore, home-
schooled children apparently have a higher acceptance rate at some
colleges than other students. 78 Recent application data indicates that
"Stanford University received 35 applications from home schoolers for
the 2000-2001 academic year, accepting nine students. This accept-
ance rate, 26%, is nearly twice that of the university's non-home-
schooled applicants." 79
This is not necessarily surprising given that parents perform the
work of professional educators not for compensation, but for the wel-
fare of their children. 80 As a result, they demonstrate heightened
dedication to the child's progress.8 ' Furthermore, home-schooled
children are educated in smaller groups, which facilitates a more
hands-on approach to teaching and allows the parent to mold the ma-
terial to fit the unique characteristics of the child.8 2 A child who
struggles to grasp a particular subject will receive additional help if
necessary, while a child who excels in a particular area will be able to
further refine that area. -8 3 Indeed, "[t]he advantages to home school-
ing are systemic and fundamental."8 4
73 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 3-7; see also BradJ. Davidson, Balancing Parental Choice,
State Interest, and the Establishment Clause: Constitutional Guidelines for States'School-Choice Legis-
lation, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 435, 437-38 (2002); Page, supra note 15, at 197.
74 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 8-20 ("Many studies over the last two decades have
established the academic excellence of home-schooled children. Not only can home-
schooled students compete with children in public school, they excel, generally perform-
ing much better than the average student.").
75 See Page, supra note 15, at 193. Home-schooled children often take examinations
such as the SAT and ACT, but compulsory standardized testing for home-schooled chil-
dren is not universal. See id.
76 See id. at 191.
77 See KLCKA, supra note 14, at 171-79.
78 See Page, supra note 15, at 190-91.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 193.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 194.
83 See id.
84 Id. at 194.
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C. Concerns Regarding Home Schooling
Despite the ostensible advantages to home schooling, concerns
remain about the institution as a whole.8 5 First, home schooling com-
promises the state's interest in financing public education.8 6 For
every student that is home schooled, a school district loses between
three and four thousand dollars in tax funding from the state and
federal authorities.8 7 Despite the financial burden on the state, the
current trend has been toward deregulating home schooling. 8 Chris-
topher Klicka, Senior Counsel for the Home School Legal Defense
Association," however, contends that home schooling may threaten
school officials' jobs, suggesting that officials cannot remain objective
in evaluating the merits of home schooling.9 °
Another state concern is that home-schooled children do not re-
ceive the same quality education as their publicly or privately schooled
counterparts.9 l One common argument asserts that public school of-
ficials and teachers tend to have a higher education than home-
schooling parents9 2:
Many public school officials actually believe they are the "guardians
of the children," and as such they need sufficient controls over all
the children within the boundaries of their school districts. They
sincerely believe that since they often have seven years of higher
education, they know what type of education is best for all
children .1
These officials cannot comprehend how a parent with only a high
school education can properly educate children.9 4 Further, states re-
main concerned that some children are "slipping through the
cracks"9 5 and "fail to meet minimum standards set for all students."9 6
However, the striking educational success of home-schooled children
tends to overshadow these concerns.9
7
Finally, states worry that home-schooled children do not experi-
ence proper social and interpersonal development. 8 Parents address
85 See KLIcKA, supra note 14, at 21-27.
86 See Page, supra note 15, at 203.
87 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 21-22.
88 See id. at 20.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 22.
91 See id. at 22-26.
92 See id.
93 Id. at 22.
94 See id.
95 Page, supra note 15, at 201-03 (emphasis omitted).
96 Id. at 201.
97 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the comparatively high
performance and success of home-schooled children).
98 See Page, supra note 15, at 194-98.
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this concern in various ways.99 Some parents may deliberately expose
their children to social activities, such as little league or church
groups. 0 0 Other parents actually feel relief that their children avoid
exposure to the detrimental social environment of public schools.' 0 '
D. Home-Schooling Legislation
Whatever the underlying rationale, states often seek to regulate
home schooling. State regulation falls into two categories: ends fo-
cused and process focused.' 0 2 Ends-focused legislation merely re-
quires that children demonstrate certain skills at specific points in
time.' 0 3 Generally, standardized testing would fall under this cate-
gory. Pennsylvania provides an example of one such statute:
The department shall establish a list, with a minimum of five tests,
of nationally normed standardized tests from which the supervisor
of the home education program shall select a test to be adminis-
tered if the supervisor does not choose the Statewide tests. At the
discretion of the supervisor, the portfolio may include the results of
nationally normed standardized achievement tests for other subject
areas or grade levels. The supervisor shall ensure that the nationally
normed standardized tests or the Statewide tests shall not be admin-
istered by the child's parent or guardian. 10 4
Such ends-focused legislation signifies a hands-off approach to home
schooling in which the state intervenes only if a child falls below a
preset standard of acceptability.1 0 5 The same Pennsylvania statute
provides that if the superintendent of the public school district deter-
mines that a child is not receiving an adequate education at home,
that child "shall be promptly enrolled in the public school district of
residence or a nonpublic school or a licensed private academic
school."106
Such statutes often provide various procedural safeguards before
the child is placed in public schools, however. 10 7 If a superintendent
suspects deficiencies in educational quality, the superintendent must
99 See id. at 196-97.
100 See id. at 196.
101 See id. at 197.
102 See id. at 209.
103 See id.
104 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(e)(1) (West 2006).
105 See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 22.1-254.1 (C) (2006) ("The parent who elects to provide
home instruction shall provide the division supeintendent... evidence that the child has
attained a composite score in or above the fourth stanine" on a battery of achievement
tests which have been approved by the Board of Education for use in the public schools.).
106 § 13-1327.1(1).
107 See, e.g., § 22.1-254.1 (C) ("In the event that evidence of progress as required.., is
not provided by the parent, the home instruction program for that child may be placed on
probation for one year.... If the remediation plan and evidence are not accepted or the
required evidence of progress is not, provided ... following the probationary year, home
1186 [Vol. 92:1177
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provide a guardian with notice and an opportunity to present more
information demonstrating that the lessons are adequate."', Then,
the school board of directors must arrange a hearing before a quali-
fied and impartial hearing examiner.'10 Ultimately, the guardian may
appeal the examiner's decision to the secretary of education or in
state court.' 10
Proponents of home schooling prefer ends-focused legislation to
process-focused legislation because the former tends to be less intru-
sive than the latter."'I Most litigation over home schooling involves
process-focused legislation, which seeks to "control the way in which a
parent teaches."' 1 2 Process-focused legislation tends to regulate home
schooling to the same extent it regulates public schooling; for exam-
ple, Missouri's home-schooling statute contains several specific provi-
sions. 113 To prove that the child is receiving regular instruction, the
parent must maintain "[a] plan book, diary, or other written record
indicating subjects taught and activities engaged in,"' 14 "[a] portfolio
of samples of the child's academic work,"' 15 "[a] record of evaluations
of the child's academic progress,"116 or "[o] ther written [ ] or credible
evidence"'1' 7 that would demonstrate the same. Furthermore, the stat-
ute requires that home schooling "[o]ffer at least one thousand hours
of instruction, at least six hundred hours of which will be in reading,
language arts, mathematics, social studies and science."'" 18
The type of legislation that this Note recommends is ends fo-
cused. However, to ensure constitutionality, this particular legislation
should be narrowly tailored to avoid crediting curricula that could not
be taught in public schools. The legislation would not mandate that
particular texts or subjects be taught, but that certain texts or subjects
not receive state approval, implied or otherwise.
instruction shall cease and the parent shall make other arrangements for the education of
the child.").
108 § 13-1327.1 (h).
109 Id. § 13-1327.1(k).
110 Id.
I11 See Page, supra note 15, at 210 ("The distinction between ends-focused and process-
focused regulation is the first way to distinguish between regulations meriting serious con-
sideration, based on their potential for benefit to the educational level of the public, and
those which serve no legitimate public end."). Page is a proponent of home schooling and
contends that states should permit home schools to operate freely. See id. at 213.
112 Id. at 209.
113 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031 (West 2006).
114 Id. § 167.031.2(2)(a)a.
115 Id. § 167.031.2(2)(a)b.
116 Id. § 167.031.2(2)(a)c.
117 Id. § 167.031.2(2)(a)d.
118 Id. § 167.031.2(2)(b).
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E. Vagueness
Most home-schooling legislation that fails to satisfy constitutional
requirements is struck down as unconstitutionally vague. I" 9 The Su-
preme Court set out the standard for vagueness in Grayned v. City of
Rockfordl 2°: "[A]n enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined .... A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to [police officers] , judges, and juries for resolution on
an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application."'12 1
A statute is vague if it fails to put the average citizen on notice of
the boundaries and extent of the law.122 For example, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin once struck down a statute requiring attendance
in either public or private school because it failed to define "private
school." 123 Similarly, in 1985 Minnesota's highest court struck down
for vagueness a statute requiring that home-schooling teachers have
"essentially equivalent" qualifications to public school teachers.1 24
Some process-focused legislation is struck down because it promotes
standardization that would render home schooling indistinguishable
from public schooling. Regulations cannot be so severe as to eradi-
cate the difference between the two. 125
II
ANALYSIS
What is ignored in the debate over home-schooling regulation is
what the concept of home schooling implies and whether those impli-
cations justify the type of restrictive ends-focused regulation that this
Note supports. The level of state and parental interest in a child's
education is in constant flux. Before the state's interest in universal
education earned recognition, education was solely the province of
the parents. Since that point, there has been a tenuous balance be-
tween the state interests and parental rights, under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Nevertheless, so long as it is within the state's
power to provide for the primary education of children within its dis-
tricts, state-approved subjects will be taught in public schools. Fur-
thermore, even in states with the loosest restrictions on home
119 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 84 ("A vague compulsory attendance law is one where
the local school district or school official is given virtually unlimited discretion to define
key terms in the law, or generally has the freedom to 'legislate' his own home school pol-
icy." (emphasis omitted)).
120 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
121 Id. at 108-09.
122 See KLicA, supra note 14, at 85.
123 State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. 1983).
124 State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985).
125 See KtjcKA, supra note 14, at 46.
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schooling, the curricula in home schools must satisfy state require-
ments. It necessarily follows that the curricula taught by parents or
other home-schooling teachers in satisfaction of state requirements
implicitly has state approval.
Parents have asserted a fundamental right to direct the educa-
tional upbringing of their children.126 In Ellis,'27 the parents chose to
home school because they believed that public education promoted
teachings, values, and ideas contrary to their religious convictions. 128
The parents questioned the validity of the state's authority to investi-
gate the instruction and curriculum that they offered. 129 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the statute was overbroad and infringed on their
First Amendment rights. 130 The court's analysis centered on whether
"the statute unnecessarily impinges upon plaintiffs' first amendment
right to direct the religious upbringing of their children." 131 The court
rephrased the plaintiffs' claim, recognizing the difference between
the right to direct the religious upbringing of one's children, which
falls under the freedom of religion provision of the First Amendment,
and the claimed right to direct the educational upbringing of one's
children.
The state, not parents, determines the curriculum in public
schools.' 32 School boards determine most of the particulars of the
curriculum. 13 3 State school boards select required and optional
courses for students attending public schools and prescribe what top-
ics they will study. 134 States even regulate the curricula in private
schools.' 35 This leads to incongruity. Parents, who have little say as to
the curricula in public schools, have almost sole discretion over what
to teach their children in a home-school setting, even though they are
126 See Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mo. 1985) ("Plaintiffs complain that
the statute unnecessarily impinges upon their first amendment rights to direct the educa-
tional upbringing of their children...
127 Id.
128 See id. at 379.
129 See id. at 380.
130 See id. at 382.
131 Id. (emphasis added).
132 See, e.g., AtA. CODE § 16-6B-2(a)(1), (b) (LexisNexis 2001) (defining required
courses as "courses which are required to be taken by every student enrolled in public
schools in the State of Alabama," including mathematics, science, and social studies); ARiz.
REv. STA-r. ANN. § 15-701.01(A)(]) (2002) (endowing the relevant school board with the
power to prescribe the curricula and set the academic standards).
13 See. § 15-701.01(B) .
134 See, e.g., § 16-6B-2 (mandating the "teaching of important historical documents in-
cluding the Constitution of the United States, The Declaration of Independence, The
Emancipation Proclamation, The Federalist Papers, and other such documents important
to the history and heritage of the United States").
135 See id. § 16-28-1 (1) (providing that private schools shall offer instruction "in the
several branches of study required to be taught in the public schools of this state").
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required to satisfy the same state education requirements. t 36 This in-
congruity cannot be explained by the nonpublic nature of home
schooling because the state also regulates private school curricula to
some extent.'
37
If Lynx and Lamb Gaede were enrolled in public school, a histori-
cally revisionist white supremacy theory of history would not have
been taught. This is not to say that their mother could not have im-
parted her racist views to her children, but she would have done so
without implicit state approval. Is her taking advantage of home
schooling to teach her children this view of history-a view of history
that could not be taught in public school (or perhaps even private
school)-tolerable? States should be able to regulate the nature of
the core topics taught in a home school to the same extent they regu-
late those taught in a public school. However, regulating the actual
curriculum raises difficult issues.
Home-schooling advocates contend that any statute restricting
curricula in home schools would face strict scrutiny in the courts.1 38
The strict scrutiny analysis is the most stringent test that a court can
apply. The court must first determine that the state action impacts a
fundamental right, triggering strict scrutiny.139 Then the court deter-
mines whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling.140 Finally,
the court analyzes the state's means in achieving the compelling inter-
est to see if they are narrowly tailored to achieve the goal. 141 However,
despite home-schooling advocates' contentions to the contrary, a stat-
ute that restricts the curricula in home schools should not necessarily
face strict scrutiny because such a statute would not infringe on a fun-
damental right unless it impinged on First Amendment interests. Par-
ents have an interest in the upbringing of their children, but that
interest alone is not fundamental and therefore should not trigger
136 Compare supra Part I.D. with supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. Although
it is true hat parents who choose to home school their children to prevent their exposure
to various aspects of public schooling are within their rights to do so, it does not follow that
these same parents may design curricula to substitute for subjects that could never be
taught in public school in the first place.
137 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28-1(1) (LexisNexis 2001).
138 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 46 ("Regulations conforming all schools, including
home schools, to the teaching standards, curriculum content, and social levels of public
schools destroys diversity and creates a danger of 'despotism over the mind.'"). Klicka uses
Hitler's rise to power as a warning against totally state-controlled educational systems. See
id. at 47. During Hitler's rise to power, he gained control of the educational system and
used it to indoctrinate the youth of the German nation in fascism. Id.
139 See Reno v. Flores, 557 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (observing that substantive due process
analysis "forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at a14
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest") (citations omitted).
140 See id.
141 See id.
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strict scrutiny. 142 Although current precedent vests a fundamental
right only in the religious upbringing of one's children, restricting
particular books or topics presents a delicate problem.
Because they assume, unjustifiably, that strict scrutiny should ap-
ply to home-schooling regulations in all instances, home-schooling ad-
vocates make some erroneous legal criticisms. For example, advocates
of home schooling often complain that "[t]he problem with many of
[the home-schooling] cases is that they misapply the 'compelling in-
terest test' in direct contradiction to United States Supreme Court
precedents."'1 43 Klicka claims that "[t]hese cases against home school-
ing either apply the wrong constitutional test (a reasonableness test)
or ignore the evidentiary requirements of the 'least restrictive' burden
of the state."'14 4 However, in the section of his book dealing with "er-
roneous" application of the reasonableness standard, Klicka cites cases
pertaining to regulation of religious schools. 145 One such case is Sheri-
dan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education,146 in which a church
objected to state-mandated teacher certification for religious rea-
sons. 1 47 The court held that the compelling state interest was "the
provision of an education to all children" 148 and that the teaching
certification requirement was a reasonable means. 149 Klicka, however,
sees the issue as concerning the compelling interest test as opposed to
reasonableness. 150 This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
the law. Klicka's concern should not be with the distinctions between
the reasonableness test and the compelling interest test because they
are two parts of the same test. If the court first determines that that
the right in question requires a compelling state interest to regulate,
then the next requirement is that the regulation be narrowly tailored
and use only the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. 15 1
The reasonableness inquiry is necessary only if the court determines
that a fundamental right is not at issue.
There is a second misconception in Klicka's analysis. Klicka cites
several cases in his section highlighting the misapplication of the rea-
142 See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
143 KLicKA, supra note 14, at 73.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 75-80.
146 348 N.W.2d 263 (Mich. 1984).
147 See id. at 267-68.
148 Id. at 274.
149 Id.
150 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 76.
151 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 578
(1993) (Blackmun,J., concurring) ("When the State enacts legislation that intentionally or
unintentionally places a burden upon religiously motivated practice, it must justify that
burden by 'showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state
interest.'" (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981))).
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sonableness test.1 52 In each of these cases, the plaintiffs claimed relig-
ious objections to the particular state regulation. Klicka, therefore,
may be conflating the fundamental right that parents have to direct
the religious upbringing of their children with a right to direct their
educational upbringing. This confusion may be due to the Court's in-
consistent description of the parental right to direct the upbringing of
a child as a fundamental right.1 53 Whether a fundamental right to
direct the general upbringing of a child 54 exists, the right to direct a
child's education is not itself fundamental. If it were, there would
have been no need to ascertain whether the state was infringing on a
First Amendment right. Instead, any case regarding regulation of
home schooling would have to pass the strict scrutiny standard, which
requires both a compelling state interest and the least restrictive
means. However, as the law currently stands, only state action that
affects religion in education is subject to strict scrutiny.
The courts reserve strict scrutiny analysis for cases in which the
state infringes upon a fundamental right. In the realm of home
schooling, the fundamental right usually at issue is the First Amend-
ment right to free exercise of religion. 55 States have also recognized
this concern and drafted their statutes accordingly. 56 Wyoming, for
152 See KijcKA, supra note 14, at 76-78. Among them are People v. DeJonge, 501
N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993); State v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981); and
State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). These three cases each dealt with teacher
certification requirements.
153 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000) (plurality opinion) (affirmingjudg-
ment of Washington Supreme Court that a state statute allowing grandparents to sue for
visitation rights "unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of parents to rear
their children" (emphasis added)).
154 1 again emphasize the distinction between the right to direct the religious upbring-
ing of a child and the right to direct the educational upbringing of a child or the right to
direct the rearing of a child generally. The right to direct the religious upbringing of a
child derives from the First Amendment right to freedom of religion. See U.S. CONST.
amend. 1. The right to direct the educational upbringing is the central concern of this
Note and is distinct from the general concerns of child-rearing discussed in Troxel.
155 See KLlcA.&, supra note 14, at 49-71 (discussing the judiciary's approach to cases
involving home schooling for religious purposes).
156 Laura J. Bach, Note, For God or Grades? States Imposing Fewer Requirements on Religious
Home Schoolers and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 1337 (2004).
Bach gives a very illustrative example of the exceptions made for families home schooling
for religious reasons. See id. at 1337. In a neighborhood of three home-schooling families
in which two families consist of parents that have both attained only high school degrees
and one consists of parents that have both completed bachelor's degrees, one of the high
school educated families is home schooling for religious reasons. See id. If this occurred in
Alabama, the family providing religious education would only have to fill out a one-time
attendance form while the other two families would have "fewer choices and greater obsta-
cles." Id. If this occurred in Virginia, that family would have an exemption from compli-
ance with the home-schooling statute while the other two families would have to comply.
Id. Bach gives several more examples, but what remains clear is that states avoid regulating
religious-home-schooling families for fear of infringing on a fundamental right and violat-
ing the Establishment Clause. That fear is not present when the regulations affect only
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example, licenses the creators of home-schooling curricula to exclude
"any concept, topic or practice in conflict with [their] religious doc-
trines."15 7 Similarly, Missouri provides that "[n] othing . . . shall re-
quire a . . . home school to include in its curriculum any concept,
topic, or practice in conflict with the school's religious doctrines.' '15
However, other than permitting religious freedom in curriculum de-
sign, states do not exempt home schools from general curriculum
requirements. 59
Consequently, a statute that excludes racist teachings from other-
wise acceptable home-schooling curricula should not have to pass
strict scrutiny because it seeks to curtail only secular teachings.1 60 Al-
though parents may impart their beliefs to their children, secular be-
liefs do not warrant the level of free speech protection given to
religious beliefs in home-schooling situations, and therefore do not
warrant the blanket blessing of the state. As the Supreme Court has
observed, "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it
is based on purely secular considerations .... ,,161 However, despite
this, home-schooling advocates contend that there is a fundamental
right that home-schooling regulations would infringe. The Note now
turns to an analysis of this claim and how a home-schooling regulation
might survive strict scrutiny even if it impinges on a fundamental
right.
A. The Advocates' "Fundamental" Right
Advocates of home schooling that is free of state restrictions be-
lieve that parents confer authority upon schools to educate their chil-
families that engage in secular home schooling because there is no fundamental right with
which the states must concern themselves.
157 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-101 (a) (vi) (2006).
158 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031.3 (West 2006).
159 See, e.g., id. § 167.031; § 21-4-102(b) ("A home-based educational program shall
meet the requirements of a basic academic educational program .. ").
160 To curb state-mandated standardization of home-school curricula, Missouri pro-
vides that "[a]ny other provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, all depart-
ments or agencies of the state of Missouri shall be prohibited from dictating through rule,
regulation or other device any statewide curriculum for private, parochial, parish or home
schools." § 167.031(3). This type of bar, however, would not prevent a legislature from
enacting the statute proposed in this Note, which limits the realm of acceptable curricula
rather than mandating particular curricula.
161 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). In the news segment on Lynx and
Lamb, their mother conceded that her teachings were not religious. See Primetime (ABC
television broadcast Oct. 20, 2005) available at http://mfile.akamai.com/16688/wmv/ab-
condemand.download.akamai.com/16688/prem/051020ptl-hatemusic.wmv ("[I] f we
were Christians, they would be maybe singing Christian rock songs. But we're not. We're
white nationalists and so, of course, that's a part of our life and I share that part of my life
with my children.").
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dren. In School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson,16 2 the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma overturned the expulsion of a child for his parents' re-
fusal to allow him to take required singing lessons. 16  The court rea-
soned that parents, as guardians of their children's well-being, are
"free to a great extent to select the course of study" of their chil-
dren. 164 Moreover, the court observed that the schools only attained
authority over children by virtue of parental delegation. 165 According
to Klicka, the court further observed that "the Oklahoma law modifies
that absolute parental right very minimally. The parents' rights are
still supreme since the public school's authority is given by the parents
and limited by the parents.' 66 This argument derives from the idea that
parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing, and hence
the education, of their children. 67 Also, based on the language em-
ployed in Pierce, one could contend that the Court acknowledged the
state's interest in education as secondary to the right of parents to
direct such education. 168
B. The States' "Compelling" Interest
After finding that parents have a fundamental right to direct
their child's education, the State would need to articulate a compel-
ling interest that justifies regulating education. The states have the
authority to see "that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to
162 103 P. 578 (Okla. 1909).
163 Id. at 582.
164 Id. at 581.
165 Id. ("It is clear that neither the statute or common law gives to the teacher or
school officers the exclusive authority they claim[,] . . . unless they get it upon the theory
that the mere act of sending the children to school amounts to a delegation of the parental
authority which the law of the land places in the hands of the parent. .. ").
166 KLICKA, supra note 14, at 42 (emphasis added). However, Thompson does not stand
for the proposition that parents reign supreme in all educational matters. States generally
do not regard singing, unlike history or social studies, as a core or required course. See,
e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-101 (a) (vi) (2006) ("'Basic academic educational program' is
one that provides a sequentially progressive curriculum of fundamental instruction in read-
ing, writing, mathematics, civics, history, literature and science."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters
of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (establishing that al-
though parents have a fundamental right to direct their children's education, the state may
still intervene when it has a compelling interest it wishes to protect).
167 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at
534-35).
168 See 268 U.S. at 534-35. The Court first found it "entirely plain that the [state action
at issue] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children." Id. Then the Court continued that the "rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasona-
ble relation to some purpose within the competency of the state." Id. at 535. Together,
these sentences could support the conclusion that parents have a fundamental right in
overseeing their children's education.
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the public welfare." 169 Because governments generally have a compel-
ling state interest in protecting the public welfare, states thus have a
compelling interest in restricting teachings that deleteriously affect
the public welfare.170 Indeed, "[t]he capacity to impart instruction to
others is given by the Almighty for beneficent purposes; and its use
may not be forbidden or interfered with by government[ ]-certainly
not, unless such instruction is, in its nature, harmful to the public morals or
imperils the public safety." 171 Implicitly approving the hateful revisionist
history that some parents teach to their home-schooled children
should qualify as harmful to the public morals or perilous to the pub-
lic safety. Children carry the prejudices they learn during youth,
prejudices that society seeks to eradicate when they embody ideolo-
gies of hate and intolerance, throughout their lives. 172 When the gov-
ernment is the source of prejudicial conduct, as it is when it allows
parents to teach bigotry under the auspices of state-sanctioned home
schooling, courts "subject [the conduct] to the most rigid scrutiny."'173
Practical problems are inherent in any state attempt to regulate
home-school curricula. First, regulation governing teachers may over-
step and infringe on the parental right to direct a child's upbringing.
However, the simple answer to this objection is that when parents cre-
ate home-school curricula for their children, they assume the duties of
teachers. This is the difference between regulating the upbringing of
a child generally and regulating the educational upbringing of a
child. The Pierce Court did not regulate parents as parents, but as
administrators of education.1 7 4 Pierce may have recognized the funda-
mental parental right to see to the upbringing of a child, but where
education is concerned, the government's authority to protect public
welfare trumps this interest.
In addition, the strength of the parents' interest may undermine
the ability of the proposed legislation to prevent parents from im-
parting racist or prejudiced teachings. If a parent teaches a child prej-
udicial ideologies as part of the child's upbringing, the parent has
169 Id. at 534; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 240 n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
170 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power to ... provide for the...
general welfare of the United States.").
171 Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 11 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1926) (noting that
Justice Harlan's statement was not in conflict with the majority).
172 See RUPERT BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 120 (1995) (noting that chil-
dren who are "brought up in a particularly strict family with dominant and moralistic par-
ents [are] likely to be predisposed to develop into prejudiced adults in later life.").
173 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
174 See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (noting that parents have authority to decline "instruction [of their children]
from public teachers").
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effectively removed the state from the equation. Mrs. Gaede could
still teach her children a racist, revisionist version of history, 175 but it
would not satisfy a state educational requirement. If the state adminis-
ters standardized tests of all subjects, it implicitly asserts that it only
approves of the teachings covered by the exam. This type of statute
does not seek to prevent a parent from teaching other subjects, but
instead only credits the topics on the exam.
C. Narrowly Tailored?
With the compelling state interest articulated above, the statute
should be able to survive litigation, provided that it is narrowly tai-
lored. There are two concerns here: first, the statutory provision must
not uniformly standardize curricula between public, private, and
home schools; and second, the provision must not be vague or over-
broad. Courts may interpret a statute requiring standardized tests as
effectively promoting standardization of education.
While standardization was once desirable, 176 its vitality has less-
ened in view of the fundamental right of parents to direct the educa-
tion of their children. 177  The concern is that "[m]aking the
regulation[ ] so severe as to eradicate the distinction between home
and public education is to destroy the alternative of private education
guaranteed by Pierce."' 78 The statute will avoid offending standardiza-
tion concerns provided that the statutory provision is in negative
terms, detailing subjects or views that shall not be covered on a stan-
dardized test.
The other concern is that the statute must not be overly vague.
This has been a common, but largely unsuccessful, defense against
home-school regulation statutes. 179 Courts are generally forgiving of
arguably vague statutes aimed at promoting the educational advance-
ment of children. 180 States should be able to mandate standardized
175 See supra text accompanying notes 4-11.
176 See Burgess, supra note 24, at 71 (stating that "[u]niformity, conformity, and a ho-
mogeneous society [were] the justifications for compulsory public education").
177 See KLuicK, supra note 14, at 46; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031.3 (West 2006).
178 KLicKA, supra note 14, at 46. Klicka continues,
The use of public schools to instill political and religious values uniformly
throughout all schools poses a serious threat to the marketplace of ideas
and the integrity of the democratic process. Regulations conforming all
schools, including home schools, to the teaching standards, curriculum
content, and social levels of public schools destroys diversity and creates a
danger of "despotism over the mind."
Id. (citation omitted).
179 See, e.g., State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a
compulsory education statute was not unconstitutionally vague).
180 See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statute,
Regulation or Policy Governing Home Schooling or Affecting Rights of Home-Schooled Students, 70
A.L.R. 5th 169 § 7 (1999).
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testing with the same criteria they use to legislate public schools.
There are currently standardized testing statutes applied to home-
schooled children that pass constitutional muster.' 8 ' These statutes
exist to ensure that children receive adequate education at home. 82
Under the proposed legislation, the state would not use the standard-
ized tests to ensure a certain caliber of education, but to signal the
topics of which it approves. Granted, the state cannot presume to tell
parents which beliefs to impart to their children when they are acting
solely in their capacity as parents, but it can refuse to condone such
teachings by not crediting them.
D. Proposed Home-Schooling Legislation'8 3
This section proposes a home-schooling statute that incorporates
the concerns explored in this Note. The proposed legislation borrows
from sections of existing statutes. It reflects a desire to promote the
benefits that home schooling offers, but to curtail the possibility that
the state may accept prejudicial and improper education in satisfac-
tion of its educational requirements and thereby condone those views.
Notwithstanding the restriction of curricula, the proposed statute
does not impose many mandatory duties.
§ 1. Definitions
"Home instruction" shall mean a program conducted, in compli-
ance with this section, by the parent or guardian or such person hav-
ing legal custody of the child or children.
"Supervisor" shall mean the parent or guardian or such person
having legal custody of the child or children who shall be responsible
for the provision of instruction.
"Appropriate education" shall mean a program consisting of in-
struction in the required subjects for the time required in this Act and
in which the student demonstrates sustained progress in the overall
program.
181 See, e.g., State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981).
182 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1(c)(2)(D)(i) (LexisNexis 2003).
183 Bruce D. Page proposed legislation in his article that advocated in part that
[t]he Legislature directs that courts of competent jurisdiction shall
presume any law or regulation previously or hereinafter enacted by this
State or its municipalities, which in any way burdens, either on its face or as
applied, home schools in their ability to direct children's education, to be
invalid. This presumption shall be overcome only by the State's or
municipality's showing that such a law or regulation is necessary to ensure a
student's or students' basic literacy skills or basic concepts of civic
responsibility, and that such a law or regulation represents the least
restrictive means possible of achieving those ends.
Page, supra note 15, at 212.
2007] 1197
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Commentary
This section defines the key terminology that will be utilized
throughout the statute. The section draws strongly from Penn-
sylvania's home education statute.'8 4 There is one significant differ-
ence: the definition of "supervisor" in the proposed statute does not
require that a parent or guardian have obtained a particular educa-
tional level.' 8 5 This is because there is no correlation between the
success of home-schooled children and their parents' level of
education. 186
§ 2. Supervisory Obligations
The supervisor who elects to provide home instruction shall pro-
vide the division superintendent by the Tuesday at least seven days
prior to the commencement of the public school year written inten-
tion to provide home instruction to the child or children in said su-
pervisor's care.
Appropriate education at the elementary school level is reading,
writing, spelling, science, geography, history of the United States and
of State X, civics, and safety education. At the high school level, the
supervisor shall teach four years of English, one year of geometry, two
years of algebra, one year of calculus, two years of humanities, and
three years of social studies.
At the end of every term, the supervisor shall administer a stan-
dardized test provided by the state in all required subjects taught dur-
ing the term.
Commentary
The last part of this section is the crux of the proposed legisla-
tion. It requires testing in all subjects, enforcing this with mandatory
standardized testing, but does not specifically say that the parents may
not teach topics not required. Furthermore, it does not restrict the
texts that the parents may use to teach the required subjects.
§ 3. Religious Exceptions
Nothing in this statute or the curriculum requirements is in-
tended to require any private school or home education program to
include in its curriculum any concept, material, or topic in conflict
184 See 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(a) (West 2006).
185 Id. ("'Supervisor' shall mean the parent or guardian ... who shall be responsible
for the provision of instruction, provided that such person has a high school diploma or its
equivalent.").
186 See KLicKA, supra note 14, at 169 (noting the breadth of study of home-schooled
children and concluding that home-schooled children outperform the national average).
1198 [Vol. 92:1177
HOME-SCHOOLED CHILDREN
with its religious doctrines or to exclude from its curriculum any con-
cept, material, or topic that is consistent with its religious doctrines.
8 7
Commentary
This final section cushions the statute from religious objection,
while simultaneously protecting the religious freedom of parents.
CONCLUSION
Although the current trend is toward deregulation of home
schools, the analysis and statutory provision that this Note provides
offers a compelling justification for increased regulation at little cost
to the states. The proposed legislation would not negatively affect the
benefits of home schooling.' 88 Nor would it curtail parental rights.
Parents cannot complain that the state is infringing on their right to
direct their child's upbringing because the statute will not prevent
them from disseminating these harmful ideas to their children. The
statute will, however, separate the state from such deleterious ideals.
Thus, Mrs. Gaede can preach her white supremacist doctrines to Lynx
and Lamb as much as she pleases. The statute proposed here would
simply establish that the state of California does not condone her be-
liefs. Standardized testing is already administered to some home-
schooled children, this Note simply recommends that it be adminis-
tered to all.
187 See Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-101(a) (vi) (2006).
188 See Page, supra note 15, at 192 ("Ray found that students educated at home in states
whose home school laws are highly restrictive performed identically to those studying in
the least restrictive states.").
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